It would not be wrong to say that Quine's entire philosophy of identity is diametrically opposed to Wittgenstein's point of view. Quine understands Wittgenstein's attitude as a regrettable misunderstanding. For Quine, we can justify the use of identity in our discourse by showing how the only identity statements that can be true without being sterile are, in Quine's own words in The Word and the Thing, "those that contain different singular terms but refer to the same thing." For Quine, identity, expressed by the sign "=," is a relational term that connects distinct occurrences of singular terms to form a statement. The resulting identity statement is said to be true if and only if its components refer to the same object. Identity is closely linked here to the division of reference, that is, to the acquisition of general terms. It can only function once these terms that divide their references have been acquired. The distinction between singular and general terms is decisive in Quine's behaviorist semantics and naturalistic epistemology.